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 Mereological Sums and 
Singular Terms 
 KATHRIN  KOSLICKI 
 1.  Introduction 
 One prominent answer to the question of what the correct theory of part-
hood and composition is for material objects, which has been embraced by 
three-dimensionalists and four-dimensionalists alike, 1 is that these objects 
are best viewed as ‘mereological sums’, ‘fusions’, or ‘aggregates’, according 
to a particular, standard, conception of mereology, viz., the family of systems 
formally analogous to Henry Leonard’s and Nelson Goodman’s ‘Calculus of 
Individuals’ (Leonard and Goodman 1940) and referred to in Simons (1987) 
as ‘Classical Extensional Mereology’ or (CEM). (A brief synopsis of the basic 
principles of standard mereology is given in section 2.) Mereological sums, 
according to this standard conception, are like sets in that their existence 
and identity depend on nothing more than the existence and identity of the 
parts that compose them; no structural requirements are set on the manner 
in which these parts must be arranged. 
 1  Three-dimensionalism (also known as ‘endurantism’) and four-dimensionalism (also known as ‘per-
durantism’ or ‘the doctrine of temporal parts’) are competing theories concerning the persistence of 
ordinary material objects over time. According to the four-dimensionalist, objects persist over time by 
perduring, i.e., by having temporal parts, in addition to their ordinary spatial parts, at all those times 
at which they exist. The three-dimensionalist, on the other hand, holds that ordinary material objects 
persist by enduring, i.e., by being, as they say, ‘wholly present’ at each time at which the object exists. For 
detailed discussion and references, see Sider (2001). From a three-dimensionalist perspective, perhaps the 
most well-known defense of the thesis that material objects are standard mereological sums can be found 
in Thomson (1983); see also Thomson (1998). For prominent representatives of this approach within the 
four-dimensionalist tradition, see Lewis (1986b), (1991); Sider (2001). 
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 The relative merits of standard mereology in the context of giving an 
analysis of material objects have received quite a bit of attention from meta-
physicians in recent years. 2 A question that has not been pursued to the 
same degree, however, is what sort of  semantic repercussions a commitment 
to mereological sums in the standard sense might have in particular on the 
predicted behavior of singular terms and our practices of using such terms to 
refer to objects. The basic problem in this connection for those who believe 
that standard mereology has a place in a metaphysical analysis of material 
objects, it seems to me, is that our practice of using singular terms to refer to 
objects, at least on the face of it, pretty obviously does not track mereologi-
cal sums: the objects we are interested in and care about, and hence which 
are represented in our discourse by means of singular terms, generally do 
not exhibit the sorts of persistence conditions we would expect them to 
have if these objects were in fact correctly analyzed as mereological sums in 
the standard sense. We are much more likely to talk about individual trouts 
and turkeys than we are to talk about trout-turkeys, to use David Lewis’s 
well-known example. 3 
 The apparent mismatch between our actual referential practices and the 
persistence conditions attributed to material objects by the supporters of 
standard mereology puts these philosophers, other things being equal, at 
a disadvantage compared to those whose ontology matches more closely 
the observed behavior of singular terms, as they are commonly used in 
ordinary discourse. In particular, as will become apparent below, the pro-
ponents of standard mereology suff er from self-imposed handicaps with 
respect to the sorts of constraints on reference to which they can appeal 
in the context of off ering an account of why our singular terms have the 
content-determining powers they appear to have. If they believe, as David 
Lewis does (see especially Lewis 1983, 1984), that some constraints on ref-
erence originate from the side of the  object referred to (as opposed to the 
speaker or the speaker’s linguistic community) and that the constraints in 
question are not exclusively  causal in nature, then additional machinery is 
needed to make up somehow for the fact that ordinary language-users speak 
as though there are trouts and turkeys but not trout-turkeys. To this end, 
 2  See for example Fine (1982), (1999); Harte (2002); Johnston (2002); Koslicki (2008); van Inwagen 
(1981), (1987), (1990a), (1990b), (1993), (1994), (2002). 
 3  A trout-turkey is a mereological sum consisting of, say, the still-attached upper half of a trout and the 
still-attached lower half of a turkey. 
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David Lewis leans heavily on his distinction between  natural and  non-natural 
properties: a highly eligible referent, according to Lewis, tends to be one 
whose boundaries are well-demarcated with respect to the highly natural 
properties; the distinction between natural and non-natural properties, in 
his view, ultimately derives from fundamental physics. 
 While I am sympathetic to Lewis’s position that a credible account of 
reference will need to appeal to the presence of well-demarcated bounda-
ries among the objects referred to, I am skeptical that his already heavily 
burdened natural/non-natural distinction can bear the additional weight of 
drawing boundaries in the right places around the referents of our singular 
terms: for conglomerations of undetached rabbit-parts, for example, will in 
general contrast with their environment just as much as single rabbits do, 
when it comes to such considerations as, say, the density of matter, the rela-
tive abundance of chemical properties, favored loci of causal chains, and the 
like, in the relevant regions of spacetime. Thus, Lewis’s natural/non-natural 
distinction among properties, as I will argue below, is not suffi  cient to avoid 
Quinean indeterminacy for singular terms. Those who are in the business 
of giving an analysis of constructions involving full-fl edged predication, 
as opposed to constructions that presuppose merely spatial overlap among 
denotations (see Evans 1975), will thus want to go in for an ontology that 
places more stringent structural constraints on the referents of singular 
terms than are supplied by standard mereology. 
 2.  Standard Mereology 
 (CEM) is a very simple, elegant and surprisingly powerful theory. 4 
It requires only a single primitive notion in terms of which the 
remainder of the mereological concepts utilized by the theory can 
be defined. In its standard formulations, (CEM) consists of a mere 
three axioms; all other statements of the theory follow as theorems 
from the definitions and axioms of the system. The single primitive 
can be chosen to be proper parthood, proper-or-improper parthood, 
overlap, disjointness, or sum; the other notions are definable in terms 
 4  The fi rst formulation of (CEM) appears to have been given by Stanislaw Leśniewski, informally in 
Leśniewski (1916) and formally in Leśniewski (1927–1930). The classical statement of (CEM) in English 
is Henry Leonard and Nelson Goodman’s ‘Calculus of Individuals’ (Leonard and Goodman 1940). 
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of whichever one is taken as primitive. Identity is either assumed as 
given or (more controversially) as definable in terms of the primi-
tive mereological notion. Algebraically speaking, while parthood is a 
mere partial ordering, (CEM) has the strength of a complete Boolean 
algebra, with the zero element deleted. 
 In terms of parthood and overlap, the notion of a mereological sum 
(aggregate/fusion) for example can be defi ned as follows:
 Mereological Sum : S is a mereological sum of some objects, x 
1
 . . . x 
n
 , just in 
case S has all of x 
1
 . . . x 
n
 as parts and has no part that does not overlap any 
of x 
1
 . . . x 
n
 . 
 A very accessible formulation of (CEM), which is slightly diff erent from, 
but formally equivalent to, that of Leonard and Goodman (1940), is given in 
Lewis (1991), where the three basic axioms of standard mereology are stated 
informally as follows:
 Axiom 1 (Unrestricted Composition): Whenever there are some objects, then 
there exists a mereological sum of those objects. 
 Axiom 2 (Uniqueness of Composition): It never happens that the same objects 
have two diff erent mereological sums. 
 Axiom 3 (Transitivity): If x is part of some part of y, then x is part of y. 
 Given Unrestricted Composition and the Uniqueness of Composition, 
mereological sums can now be seen to be analogous to sets in certain 
respects: by Unrestricted Composition, there is a sum whenever there is a 
plurality of objects (any plurality), just as there is a set for any plurality of 
objects (modulo the paradoxes); and by the Uniqueness of Composition, 
the identity of a sum depends on nothing more than the identity of its parts, 
just as (by the Axiom of Extensionality) the identity of a set depends on 
nothing more than the identity of its members. In other respects, however, 
mereological sums and sets are not alike:  in particular, standard mereol-
ogy makes no room for a distinction analogous to that between subset and 
membership. For given that all the entities quantifi ed over in standard mere-
ology are of the same ontological type, viz., the type, individual, standard 
mereology only recognizes a single sum that can be formed from any given 
plurality of individuals. 
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 3.  The Utility of Proper Names 
 If we take our common practice of using singular terms, in particular proper 
names, at face value, it would appear that such expressions often serve as 
names for certain commonly recognized kinds of things: among the proper 
names we typically employ, for example, are names for human beings, fi c-
tional or real (‘Hamlet’, ‘Bismarck’); 5 names for pets (‘Fido’); names for 
places (‘Paris’); names for signifi cant historical events (‘the Civil War’), 
periods (‘the Renaissance’), or important agents within history (‘the Holy 
Roman Empire’); 6 names for artistic creations (‘Star Wars’); brand names 
(‘Duracell’) or names for products (‘iPod’); and so on. 7 
 P. F. Strawson writes that a proper name is called for among a circle of 
language-users, when there is frequent need or occasion to refer to a par-
ticular; when there is interest in the continuing identity of the particular 
from occasion to occasion; and when there is no short description or title 
for that particular available to members of the linguistic circle in question 
(Strawson 1974, p. 42). In such a situation, Strawson remarks, the use of a 
proper name for the object in question is appropriate:
 So it is convenient to have in circulation in such groups a tag, a designation, 
which does not depend for its referential or identifying force upon any particu-
lar such position or relation, which preserves the same referential force through 
its object’s changes of position or relation and has the same referential force for 
communicators who know the object in diff erent connections and for whom 
quite diff erent descriptions would be uppermost. (Strawson 1974, pp. 45–46) 
 5  For the purposes of this discussion, I take names like ‘Hamlet’ or ‘Bismarck’ to be names of human 
beings, rather than persons, only in order to sidestep complicated issues concerning personal identity 
which are tangential to my main concerns. 
 6  I take it that such expressions as ‘the Civil War’, ‘the Renaissance’, or ‘the Holy Roman Empire’, are 
names, even though they are prefi xed by the defi nite article; this issue is, however, also not central to 
the current discussion. 
 7  By pointing out that names are typically used as names for certain kinds of objects, I do not intend to 
commit myself to a descriptive view of names, i.e., one according to which a designation of the kind of 
object referred to in some way becomes part of the meaning of a name (e.g., as though ‘human being’ 
somehow makes it into the semantic content of ‘Bismarck’). Speakers can, and certainly have been, 
wrong about what kind of object a given name refers to: witness, for example, ‘Venus’, ‘Hesperus’, and 
‘Phosphorus’, which were at fi rst intended to be used as names for a star; it was only found out later that 
these names were in fact names for a planet. In this way, the case of proper names is parallel to that of 
natural kind terms, as they were analyzed by Kripke (1971), (1980) and Putnam (1975): the extension of 
a term like ‘water’, on this approach, is determined by means of a same-kind relation of some sort which 
instances of the liquid bear to certain initial samples; but speakers can certainly be either ignorant or 
wrong about the nature of the same-kind relation which in fact determines the extension of their term. 
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 It is convenient in such situations to be able to take recourse to a proper name, 
Strawson proposes, because there is in such situations “no one particular fact 
about any member, no particular relationship in which [the object referred to] 
stands, such that it is on account of that fact or relationship that [it] is a standing 
object of reference for members of this group” (Strawson 1974, p. 46). Contrast 
a situation of this type, for example, with one in which it is suffi  cient to single 
out an object of interest by referring to it as ‘your cigar’ or ‘the yellow one in 
the middle’; clearly, designations of this sort, while they might be perfectly suf-
fi cient to achieve one’s communicative purposes at a particular moment, are 
of a much more fl eeting nature and would not be able to preserve continuity 
of reference through, say, changes of ownership, color, or position. Thus, the 
purpose of the availability of a proper name for a particular group of language-
users, if Strawson’s observations are correct, is typically to off er the members of 
a language-group a means of referring to a particular object of interest that is 
both (i)  stable and (ii)  shared : (i) it is stable in the sense that continuity of refer-
ence is preserved in the face of changes in the object referred to or among the 
members of the language-group; (ii) it is a shared means of referring to the 
object in question in the sense that the availability of the proper name may 
bridge diff erences in the information that the members of the group may pos-
sess regarding the object to which they are referring. 8 
 If a certain expression is commonly used as a name for a human being, pet, 
place, etc., then it may be employed as a means not only of communicating 
 8  A very diff erent, substitution-theoretic, account of what distinguishes singular terms from other types 
of expressions is given in Brandom (1994). In his account of the distinction between singular terms 
and general terms, Brandom focuses on a contrast he perceives between the inferential roles played 
by these two types of expressions. Singular terms, in Brandom’s view, give rise to  symmetric substi-
tutional inferences:  for example, from ‘Mark Twain authored  Huckleberry Finn ’ we may infer ‘Samuel 
Clemens authored  Huckleberry Finn ’; moreover, so Brandom notes, this inference is  reversible . In con-
trast, substitution-inferences which turn on the predicates contained in statements, in Brandom’s view, 
tend not to be symmetric in the same manner: thus, from ‘Benjamin Franklin walked’, we may infer 
‘Benjamin Franklin moved’; but this inference is not reversible. As it stands, however, the contrast in 
question is more of an artifact of how the particular examples Brandom considers are picked than an 
indication of any genuine semantic diff erence between singular terms and general terms. For the object 
referred to by ‘Mark Twain’ is numerically identical to the object referred to by ‘Samuel Clemens’, 
whereas the denotation of ‘moves’ neither coincides with nor is included in the denotation of ‘walks’; 
rather, the denotation of ‘walks’ is included in the denotation of ‘moves’. Inferences which turn on 
predicates whose denotations do coincide (e.g., perhaps ‘is a doctor’ and ‘is a physician’) will be similarly 
reversible. Of course, Brandom cannot help himself to this explanation of the contrast between the two 
inferences in question, since for him the metaphysical notion of an object is supposed to be derivative 
of the semantic distinction between singular terms and general terms. Thus, he cannot take for granted 
that identities among the denotations of terms are already given to us, as a datum to which the semantics 
may refer in order to draw a distinction between singular and general terms. 
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information of interest about the object in question at a single time (as 
when we say, for example, that Bismarck unifi ed Germany in 1871); it may 
also be used to track the same human being, pet, place, etc., over time (as 
when we say, for example, that Bismarck was Chancellor of Germany from 
1871 to 1890). 9 Taking our common practice of using proper names again 
at face value, these expressions certainly seem to preserve stability of refer-
ence, among other things, in the face of changes in the parts of the object 
referred to. Since we commonly regard human beings as the sorts of things 
that can persist through the gaining and losing of many of their parts, we 
similarly take the name, ‘Bismarck’, given that this expression is standardly 
employed as the name for a human being, to preserve its reference despite 
the fact that the object it refers to can be expected to undergo changes with 
respect to its parts. On the other hand, given that the parts of a human being 
must be arranged in a particular characteristic manner in order to result in 
a functioning specimen of its kind, there are other features about the parts 
of a human being, in particular their manner of arrangement, which we 
do expect to remain relatively constant in order for a single human being 
to persist from one time to another; this stability, again, transfers straight-
forwardly to names for human beings. Thus, it would seem to be a bit of a 
stretch for example to employ the name, ‘Bismarck’, to refer to the scattered 
bits of soil into which this man’s remains have decomposed after Bismarck’s 
death: since these scattered bits of soil currently fail to compose a human 
being, it would be decidedly odd to apply the same name to these scat-
tered bits of soil as to the human being from whose corpse they originated. 
A name like ‘Bismarck’, therefore, at least on the face of it, seems to refer 
to the sort of object that belongs to a commonly recognized kind (e.g., the 
kind,  human being ), that can survive gaining and losing parts over time, and 
whose parts at each time at which the object exists must be arranged in the 
particular manner characteristic of the kind of object at issue. 
 9  This point is often expressed by saying that proper names (or common nouns, for that matter) are 
associated not only with criteria of application, but also with criteria of identity. When an expression 
functions as a proper name, speakers who have mastered the use of this expression must be able to recog-
nize the object referred to by the name as the same again on diff erent occasions. According to Dummett 
(1973), this mastery on the part of the speaker also involves being able to group objects referred to by 
the use of names into  categories : for every proper name, he writes, must belong to some  range of names, 
all of which are associated with the  same criterion of identity, viz., the criteria of identity governing the 
particular category of object to which the referent of the name in question belongs; to recognize that the 
name in question belongs to this range is also, for Dummett, part of what must be mastered by a speaker 
in order to grasp the sense of a name (Dummett 1973, p. 76; see also Frege 1884, §62). 
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 If, on the other hand, material objects are construed as mereological sums 
and those singular terms that purport to refer to material objects are construed 
as referring to mereological sums, then we would expect the referents of these 
singular terms to have the persistence conditions associated with mereological 
sums. But the existence and identity of mereological sums, as we have seen in 
the previous section, depends on nothing more than the existence and identity 
of their parts:  thus, a mereological sum, S1, and a mereological sum, S2, are 
numerically identical over time or at a time just in case the parts that compose 
S1 are numerically identical to the parts that compose S2; no requirements are 
set on the manner in which these parts are arranged. If the supporter of standard 
mereology takes the route, then, of viewing singular terms, as they are standardly 
employed in ordinary discourse, as referring to mereological sums, there appears 
to be, at least on the face of it, a clash between the persistence conditions that are 
attributed by the supporter of standard mereology to the objects referred to by 
our singular terms and the way in which speakers in fact employ these singular 
terms to track objects over time. 
 To be sure, this is not the end of the story and there is additional machin-
ery which the supporter of standard mereology can invoke to try to capture 
the behavior of singular terms, as they are commonly used in ordinary dis-
course. 10 However, when evaluating the relative merits of standard mereol-
ogy as the correct theory of parthood and composition for material objects, 
we should take note of the fact that there is at least a  prima facie mismatch 
between the persistence conditions apparently exhibited by the referents 
of singular terms, as they are standardly used in ordinary discourse, and 
the persistence conditions we would expect these objects to have if ordi-
nary singular terms in fact referred to mereological sums. And this apparent 
mismatch requires the supporter of standard mereology to introduce some 
 10  For example, a natural way to go for the supporter of standard mereology would be to adopt the view 
that singular terms, as they are standardly employed in ordinary discourse, refer only to certain  phases in 
the life of a mereological sum or to certain  collections of mereological sums, diff erent ones at diff erent 
times. The fi rst line is congenial to four-dimensionalist supporters of standard mereology like Lewis 
and Sider; the second to three-dimensionalists like Thomson. According to the fi rst approach, a singular 
term like ‘Bismarck’ might be construed for example as referring only to those phases in the career of a 
particular four-dimensional space-time worm during which the ordinary spatial parts of each temporal 
slice of this worm are arranged in such a way that they sustain a living human organism. According 
to the second approach, a singular term like ‘Bismarck’ would be construed as referring to diff erent 
mereological sums at diff erent times (corresponding to the changes in parts which Bismarck undergoes 
during his lifetime), all of which are composed of parts arranged at those times in such a way that they 
can sustain a living human organism. 
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further  semantic machinery, in addition to the metaphysical apparatus to 
which he has already committed himself (e.g., counterpart theory) in order 
to overcome the apparent divergence in persistence conditions between 
mereological sums and material objects as we standardly conceive of them. 
 4.  Constraints on Reference 
 The solution to this apparent diffi  culty concerning the observed behav-
ior of our ordinary singular terms which is favored by David Lewis relies 
prominently on his distinction between natural and non-natural proper-
ties (see especially Lewis 1983, 1984). 11 Constraints on reference, in Lewis’s 
view, fall into two kinds:  (i)  those originating from facts about  use ; and 
(ii) and those originating from facts concerning the  intrinsic eligibility of 
what is referred to. The fi rst constraint locates the source of at least some 
of the content-determining powers of the language in the speaker or the 
speaker’s linguistic community: this constraint holds that content is to be 
determined at least in part by maximizing fi t with how speakers or their lin-
guistic communities tend to use the expressions and statements they utter. 
The second, and more controversial, constraint on reference traces some of 
the content-determining powers of the language to the intrinsic nature of 
the referent itself. Following this constraint on reference, we are to choose 
among two diff erent rival interpretations of a language based on how well 
each does in connecting the content of what we say to a special group of 
elite properties, the natural properties. The distinction between natural and 
non-natural properties, in Lewis’s view, derives ultimately from fundamental 
physics, at least if the latter proves to be successful. 12 
 11  Page numbers from Lewis (1983) and (1984) in what follows come from the reprinted versions of 
these papers in Lewis (1999). 
 12  Lewis considers and rejects two other approaches to reference: global descriptivism and the causal 
theory of reference (see Lewis 1983, pp. 45–47; as well as Lewis 1984 for a more detailed discussion). 
According to global descriptivism, an intended interpretation of our language is one which satisfi es a 
certain purely descriptive condition, viz., it must be compatible with ideal theory (an idealized descend-
ant of our current body of theory). This sort of approach to reference, in Lewis’s view, feeds straight into 
Putnam’s model-theoretic argument (Putnam 1978, 1980) and hence leads to radical indeterminacy of 
reference, as the purely descriptive constraints imposed by this approach to reference are powerless to 
distinguish among the countless available candidate interpretations for a given language. Alternatively, a 
purely causal approach, in Lewis’s view, only raises the further question of what it is about the referent of 
an expression that selects it as the object that satisfi es the causal constraints in question. Lewis’s natural/
non-natural distinction and the concomitant notion of intrinsic eligibility is intended as a response to 
this latter question. 
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 Naturalness, as conceived of by Lewis, is a matter of degree. Thus, the 
perfectly natural properties are those singled out by fundamental physics; 
others, such as those which go into the primitive vocabulary of chemistry 
or biology, for example, are less than perfectly natural, but still quite a bit 
more natural than, say, blueness. Blueness in turn is quite a bit more natu-
ral than, say, grueness, the (alleged) property objects have if they are green, 
when examined before some fi xed time t, or blue, when not examined 
before t. 
 How do we compare the degree of naturalness exhibited by the less 
than perfectly natural properties? Here, Lewis appeals to two assump-
tions:  (a)  that the less than perfectly natural properties will be defi nable 
in terms of the perfectly natural properties; and (b) that we can measure a 
property’s degree of naturalness by means of the complexity of the defi ni-
tion that can be given of it in terms of the perfectly natural properties. Both 
(a) and (b) strike me as quite implausible; however, since the issue of defi n-
ability has already been extensively discussed by others, I will for present 
purposes bypass the question of how exactly degree of naturalness is to be 
measured. 13 
 Naturalness is initially conceived of by Lewis as fi rst and foremost rel-
evant to the determination of predicate-meaning. Thus, a set of objects 
from the domain is more or less eligible to count as the extension of a 
one-place predicate from the language under consideration depending on 
whether and to what degree its members share a natural property; similarly 
for many-place predicates and relations. An interpretation for the language 
consequently is eligible depending on whether and to what degree it assigns 
eligible extensions to the predicates of the language. 
 Even though naturalness and eligibility are conceived of by Lewis as 
applying most directly to properties and hence to the determination of 
predicate-meaning, he does suggest a way in which these notions tend to 
have a sort of ripple-eff ect that extends to singular terms and their referents 
as well:
 Naturalness of properties makes for diff erences of eligibility not only among 
the properties themselves, but also among things. Compare Bruce with the 
 13  For critical discussion of Lewis’s account of relative naturalness as ease of defi nability in perfectly 
natural terms, see for example Hawthorne (2006), (2007); Schaff er (2004); Sider (1995), (1996); Williams 
(2007). 
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cat-shaped chunk of miscellaneous and ever-changing matter that follows him 
around, always a few steps behind. The former is a highly eligible referent, the 
latter is not. (I haven’t succeeded in referring to it, for I didn’t say just which 
such chunk ‘it’ was to be.) That is because Bruce, unlike the cat-shaped chunk, 
has a boundary well demarcated by diff erences in highly natural properties. 
Where Bruce ends, there the density of matter, the relative abundance of the 
chemical elements, . . . abruptly change. Not so for the chunk. Bruce is also much 
more of a locus of causal chains than is the chunk; this too traces back to natural 
properties, by the considerations of the previous section [cf., the role of natural 
properties with respect to causation and laws]. Thus naturalness of properties 
sets up distinctions among things. The reverse happens also. Once we are away 
from the perfectly natural properties, one thing that makes for naturalness of a 
property is that it is a property belonging exclusively to well-demarcated things. 
(Lewis 1983, pp. 48–49) 
 Lewis suggests in this passage that highly eligible referents are those whose 
boundaries are well-demarcated with respect to highly natural properties and 
which act as the loci of causal chains more so than their more gerrymandered 
cousins. Thus, a highly eligible referent, such as Bruce the cat, in Lewis’s view, 
will distinguish itself from a less highly eligible referent, such as any one of the 
presumably indefi nitely many cat-shaped chunks of miscellaneous and ever-
changing matter that inhabit spacetime regions in the vicinity of Bruce the 
cat, with respect to for example the density of matter, the relative abundance 
of chemical elements, and the like, that can be found in these regions of spa-
cetime. Moreover, Bruce the cat will more often be identifi able as the locus of 
causal chains than the more gerrymandered cat-shaped chunks of matter in the 
vicinity. Lewis’s suggested extension of the notions of eligibility and natural-
ness from properties and predicates to objects and singular terms, if successful, 
is thus intended to yield a distinction between objects whose boundaries are 
well-demarcated with respect to natural properties and those whose boundaries 
are not well-demarcated in this way; the former tend to be more highly eligible 
referents than the latter. 
 5.  Evans on Predication 
 That the presence of objects with well-demarcated boundaries is vital to 
an analysis of the distinction between singular terms and general terms is 
also the upshot of an argument provided by Gareth Evans in a completely 
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diff erent setting (Evans 1975). 14 Evans’s main target in this context is Quine’s 
inscrutability of reference thesis:  Evans wants to establish, contrary to 
Quine, that only certain ones among the stimulus-synonymous hypotheses 
concerning the nature of the entities ranged over by the expressions of a 
particular language in fact do justice to the behavior of these expressions 
with respect to predication and negation. 15 
 Suppose for example that we are confronted with a language containing 
expressions, G 
1
 , G 
2
 , G 
3
 , . . . , G 
n
 , which, when presented as one-word ques-
tions, are assented to by speakers of this language when material objects of 
various sorts are present; these expressions are, when presented as one-word 
sentences, stimulus-synonymous with the English expressions ‘A rabbit!’, ‘A 





 , F 
3
 , . . . , F 
n
 , which, when presented as one-word questions, are assented to 
when certain general features are present in the environment; these expres-
sions are, when presented as one-word sentences, stimulus-synonymous 
with the English expressions ‘White!’, ‘Warm!’, ‘Furry!’, ‘Bloodstained!’, 
and so on. 
 According to Quine’s inscrutability of reference thesis, the expressions 
of the G-type, in being stimulus-synonymous with English one-word 
sentences signifying the presence of material objects, as in ‘A rabbit!’, are 
equally stimulus-synonymous with English sentences signifying the pres-
ence of undetached parts of material objects, or temporal stages of material 
objects, as in ‘Undetached rabbit-parts!’ or ‘Rabbit-stages!’:
 For, consider ‘gavagai’. Who knows but what the objects to which this term 
applies are not rabbits after all, but mere stages, or brief temporal segments, of 
rabbits? In either event the stimulus situations that prompt assent to ‘Gavagai’ 
would be the same as for ‘Rabbit’. Or perhaps the objects to which ‘gava-
gai’ applies are all and sundry undetached parts of rabbits; again the stimulus 
 14  Page numbers from Evans (1975) in what follows are taken from the reprinted version of this paper in 
Evans (1985). Evans, of course, should not be read as agreeing with Lewis’s claim that the boundaries in 
question which are relevant to an analysis of the distinction between singular terms and general terms 
originate from the division between natural and non-natural properties; in fact, since he is sympathetic 
to an ontology consisting of enduring structured wholes, he believes that the requisite boundaries are 
drawn for him, so to speak, by the persistence conditions of the objects referred to by singular terms in 
ordinary discourse and the kinds to which these objects belong. 
 15  Expressions are stimulus-synonymous when they have the same stimulus-meaning; that is, when they 
coincide with respect to ‘the native’s total battery of present dispositions to be prompted to assent to or 
to dissent from’ the expressions, when presented as one-word sentences (Quine 1960, p. 39). 
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meaning would register no diff erence. When from the sameness of stimulus 
meanings of ‘Gavagai’ and ‘Rabbit’ the linguist leaps to the conclusion that a 
gavagai is a whole enduring rabbit, he is just taking for granted that the native 
is enough like us to have a brief general term for rabbits and no brief general 
term for rabbit stages or parts. (Quine 1960, pp. 51–52) 
 But suppose now that, in addition to single word sentences in which the 
expressions of the F-type and those of the G-type occur separately, the 
language under discussion also allows for complex expressions of the type, 
F G, i.e., expressions stimulus-synonymous with English sentences like ‘A 
white rabbit!’. Evans argues that a diff erence does now surface between the 
various interpretational hypotheses entertained by Quine. For suppose we 
interpret a particular expression of this foreign language, F 
1
 , as dividing its 
reference over all and only the world’s white things; and we interpret a par-
ticular expression, G 
1
 , as dividing its reference over all and only the world’s 
rabbits (undetached rabbit-parts, rabbit-stages, and so on). Then how are we 




 , stimulus-synonymous with 
the English ‘A white rabbit!’, ‘White undetached rabbit-parts!’, ‘White rab-
bit-stages!’, and so on? In particular, how are we to read the semantic con-
tribution of F 
1
 as combining with that of G 
1
 , in order to predict correctly 





 , in speakers of this language? 
 In some cases, the semantics of compound expressions might be correctly 
captured by requiring nothing more than that there be (reasonably sized) 
spatial overlap between the denotations of the expressions of the F-type 





 , which, let’s say, is stimulus-synonymous with the English 
‘Red water!’ (‘Red undetached water-parts!’, ‘Red water-stages!’, etc.); sup-




 , would be assented to by speakers of 
the language in a scenario in which a few drops of red ink are immersed into 
a swimming pool (Evans 1975, p. 32). A case of this sort, Evans argues, does not 
yet require the introduction of the machinery that is, in his view, involved in 
full-fl edged predication, namely that of objects and their boundaries as well as 
the idea that properties attributed to such objects must be distributed within 
their boundaries in a characteristic manner. Together, the apparatus of objects 
and their boundaries yields what is required for identity and individuation (or 
what Quine would call the ‘apparatus of divided reference’): what is needed 
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for saying when one object of a certain kind ends and another begins and 
when we encounter the same object again on a later occasion. 
 In the scenario just imagined, on the other hand, no single object seems to 
be clearly indicated whose instantiation of redness within its boundaries would 
account for the assent behavior prompted among the speakers of this language 





 ‘Red Water?’ Certainly. But which object is it, even roughly, whose satisfaction of 
the predicate ‘Red’ makes the remark true? Is it the whole pool, or just the water 
immediately diluting the ink, or one of the indefi nitely many intermediate alter-
natives? The language provides us with no way of answering these question, to 
which we must somehow fi nd an answer if the construction is predication. (Evans 
1975, p. 32) 
 I take it that what Evans means by saying that the construction at issue need 
not be interpreted as involving full-fl edged predication is that we could for 
example get by (i.e., capture the assent- and dissent-behavior generated by it 
in speakers of the language correctly) even if we interpreted the occurrences 
of the expressions, F 
2
 and G 
2




 , as both play-
ing the role of singular terms and the ‘tie’ between them as requiring merely 
that their denotations overlap spatially. There are various options as to what, 
under these circumstances, we might take these expressions to denote, if they 





 . We could for example go the Quinean route (Quine 1960, 
Ch. 3, §19ff .) and interpret F 
2
 and G 
2
 as denoting a particular scattered object 
or mereological sum, viz., the totality of the world’s red things and the totality 
of the world’s water, respectively. 16 In that case, we would predict that an utter-




 , will prompt assent-behavior among speakers of 
the language just in case the totality of the world’s red things and the totality 
of the world’s water share one or more parts in the region of spacetime with 
which the utterance in question is concerned. 
 If Evans is correct, however, this interpretational route will not succeed 





with the English ‘A white rabbit!’, ‘White undetached rabbit-parts!’, ‘White 
 16  Evans (1975, p. 32, n. 8) indicates that he favors an analysis in terms of Hartry Field’s apparatus of 
‘partial denotation’ and ‘partial satisfaction’ (see, e.g., Field 1974), but does not expand on the details of 
this idea. 
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rabbit-stages!’, and so on) for example to prompt assent-behavior from 
speakers of this language, more may be required in certain circumstances 
than that the denotation of F 
1
 merely spatially overlap that of G 
1
 . To bring 
out this point, Evans quite ingeniously imagines a scenario in which several 
brown rabbits are so arranged that their white tails are contiguous (Evans 
1975, p. 34). Certainly, the condition that there be spatial overlap between 
the world’s white things and the world’s undetached rabbit-parts is satis-
fi ed in this scenario in the particular region of spacetime with which the 
utterance in question is concerned. In fact, the overlap in question between 
the totality of the world’s white things and the totality of the world’s unde-
tached rabbit-parts may even be large enough in size and appropriately 
shaped to compare with that of one or more single white rabbits. And yet 
speakers of this language may nevertheless on such occasions dissent from 




 , since the imagined scenario does not contain one or 
more single rabbits which have whiteness distributed within their bounda-
ries in a way characteristic of white rabbits: a brown rabbit with a white tail 
does not make a white rabbit; nor do several such brown rabbits with their 
white tails arranged contiguously. 
 Consider also the interaction between several expressions of the 






 , which, let’s say, 
is stimulus-synonymous with the English ‘A bloodstained white rab-
bit!’ (‘Bloodstained white undetached rabbit-parts!’, ‘Bloodstained white 
rabbit-stages!’, and so on). As Evans remarks, it is not suffi  cient for speakers 





















 may only hold in situations in which it is the very same rabbit 
within whose boundaries whiteness and bloodstainedness are distributed in 
a characteristic fashion. Moreover, what counts as a characteristic distribu-
tion of the property within the object’s boundaries is diff erent in the case 
of whiteness and bloodstainedness: in order for a rabbit to count as white, 
it must be (roughly) predominantly white; but in order for it to count as 
bloodstained, only very few of its parts need to be bloodstained. Finally, in 
order for a single rabbit to count as both white and bloodstained, it is not 







 to prompt assent among the speakers of this language, it is not necessary 
that there be spatial overlap among the denotations of all three expressions, 
F 
3
 , F 
1
 and G 
1
 , since the compound expression does not require that there 
be any single undetached rabbit-part that is both white and bloodstained. 
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 The notion of a boundary drawn around single objects, as well as the 
characteristic distribution of a property within such a boundary, according 
to Evans, is necessary not only for a proper understanding of predication, 
but is also required to capture the semantics of negation in a language like 
ours (Evans 1975, pp. 35–36). For we may for example adopt a rule govern-
ing negation which would predict that an object satisfi es ‘not-white’ just in 
case the object in question does not satisfy ‘white’. However, in order for 
this rule to capture the force of negation in the language, it must be the 
case that when ‘white’ and ‘not-white’ are simultaneously applied to one 
and the same object, a contradiction results. And in order for this outcome 
to obtain, according to Evans, it is again necessary that we can tell the dif-
ference between where a single object of a certain kind in the domain 
stops, where another begins, and how we are supposed to fi nd the feature 
in question distributed with respect to the boundaries of this object. For 
a contradiction will only arise when it is said of one and the same object 
that a given property both is and is not distributed within its boundaries 
in a certain characteristic manner. In this way, Evans’s point concerning the 
characteristic distribution of a certain property within the boundaries of a 
single object applies not only to the proper analysis of constructions involv-
ing predication, but also to those involving negation. 
 6.  Objects and their Boundaries 
 Although Evans’s discussion is mostly focused on the role of general terms 
within the language, the lesson we learn from his arguments straightfor-
wardly extends to singular terms as well. For reference and predication 
are but two diff erent sides of a single semantic coin: whatever apparatus is 
required for a proper understanding of constructions involving full-fl edged 
predication will also be implicated in a genuine contrast between singular 
terms and general terms. Singular terms, after all, are just those expressions 
that are used to refer to the objects over which the general terms con-
tained in the language divide their reference. And general terms are ways 
of expressing the similarities and diff erences present among the referents of 
singular terms. Thus, if the presence of objects with genuinely demarcated 
boundaries is necessary for a proper understanding of predicative construc-
tions in a language like ours, then this same apparatus will carry over also 
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to what is required for an understanding of the referential properties of 
full-fl edged singular terms contained within such a language. 
 As was noted in section 3, our ordinary practice of using singular terms, 
in particular proper names, if taken at face value, leads us to believe that we 
typically employ such terms as names for commonly recognized kinds of 
things: names for human beings, fi ctional or real; names for places; names 
for signifi cant historical events, periods, or agents within history; names for 
artistic creations; brand names or names for products; and so on. Moreover, 
as Strawson remarks, proper names in particular appear to provide a com-
munity of language-users with a means of referring to an object that is both 
stable (in that it preserves sameness of reference in the face of various sorts 
of changes) and shared (in that it bridges diff erences in the informational 
background available to members of the group). 
 In one respect the conclusion reached by Evans in his discussion of 
Quinean indeterminacy, viz., that a proper semantic analysis of a language 
like ours requires a domain of objects with well-demarcated boundaries, 
accords well with the conclusion reached by David Lewis, as observed 
in section 4.  For Evans and Lewis both converge on the idea that our 
singular terms, somehow, successfully manage to refer to objects with 
well-demarcated boundaries. Thus, whatever one’s particular approach to 
reference, it should come out at the end of the day, in both Evans’s and 
Lewis’s view, that a particular cat, say, is a more highly eligible referent for 
the name, ‘Bruce’, when employed in its intended role as a name for a cat, 
than a cat-shaped chunk of miscellaneous and ever-changing matter that 
occupies a region of spacetime which only partially overlaps but does not 
coincide with that occupied by the cat in question. 
 The means, however, by which Evans and Lewis envision these bounda-
ries to be drawn are quite diff erent. For Lewis, highly eligible referents are 
those which are well-demarcated by highly natural properties. And while 
Lewis’s natural/non-natural distinction is intended to apply to objects and 
singular terms as well, it does so only derivatively: the distinction is formu-
lated in the fi rst place with properties and predicate-meanings in mind. For 
Evans, on the other hand, the domain itself, over which the singular and 
general terms of the language range, already comes pre-divided, so to speak, 
into highly eligible referents. That is, the boundaries of these objects are 
not drawn in a derivative manner by means of a distinction whose primary 
realm of application is something other than objects and singular terms; 
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rather, the idea of a single object with its boundaries, capable of enduring 
through space and time, is taken as fundamental. 17 
 But the question of how our singular terms successfully manage to pick 
out the highly eligible referents from among all the possible referents is not 
even worth asking unless the domain over which our singular terms and 
general terms range is construed in such a way that it contains ineligible or 
less highly eligible referents alongside the highly eligible ones. If such ger-
rymandered objects never make it into the domain over which our singular 
and general terms range to begin with (e.g., because a particular ontology 
does not count such ‘non-entities’ as lying within the realm of things that 
exist), then the need for a distinction between eligible and ineligible ref-
erents vanishes and, with it, the need to account for the observation that 
speakers tend to ignore the ineligible or less highly eligible referents in their 
ordinary discourse. We should thus count it as among the advantages of the 
type of approach to reference endorsed by Evans over that endorsed by 
Lewis that such an approach does not need to settle the question of how to 
distinguish the highly eligible from the less highly eligible referents. 
 Lewis is for independent reasons already committed to a domain of objects 
for singular terms and general terms which includes, in addition to cats and 
other such commonly recognized kinds of things, also all manner of more 
or less gerrymandered chunks of miscellaneous and ever-changing matter 
in the vicinity of these commonly recognized kinds of things. This com-
mitment follows from Lewis’s endorsement of the principle of unrestricted 
mereological composition, according to which for any plurality of objects, 
there exists a mereological sum of these objects (Lewis 1986b, pp. 211ff .). 
Recall from our earlier discussion (at the beginning of section 4) that Lewis 
identifi es two plausible sources towards which we should look in our search 
for constraints on reference:  (i)  use and (ii) intrinsic eligibility. The fi rst, 
which locates the source of at least some of the content-determining pow-
ers of our terms in the speaker or the speaker’s linguistic community, is not 
directly relevant to our current topic of discussion and hence has not played 
into the foregoing remarks. The second, intrinsic eligibility, is supposed 
to trace some of the content-determining powers of our language to the 
 17  An approach of this kind is also taken by Strawson; in  Individuals , for example, he remarks as fol-
lows: “Material bodies, in a broad sense of the word, secure to us one single common and continuously 
extendable framework of reference, any constituent of which can be identifyingly referred to without 
reference to any particular of any other type” (Strawson 1959, p. 54). 
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intrinsic nature of the referent itself. But now, given Lewis’s acceptance of 
standard mereology, we know that the referent itself, on Lewis’s conception, 
does not have the power to do this work on its own: rather, the work of 
providing highly eligible referents with well-demarcated boundaries must 
be accomplished by a diff erent piece of apparatus, the natural/non-natural 
distinction, whose primary target is properties and predicate-meanings and 
which, if successful, yields distinctions among objects and singular terms 
only derivatively. 
 One kind of handicap the Lewisian imposes upon himself, then, which 
others manage to avoid, is that he is on independent grounds committed 
to an ontology which creates a need for a distinction between more or less 
highly eligible referents. Those, on the other hand, who embrace a less pro-
miscuous ontology, into which the gerrymandered chunks never fi nd their 
way to begin with, have an easier time in at least this respect: they do not 
to the same extent face the need to distinguish the highly eligible referents 
from the less highly eligible ones. And, for this reason, foregoing a commit-
ment to standard mereology has the advantage, among other things, that the 
source for one kind of constraint on reference really can be located in the 
referent itself, genuinely and not merely in a derivative manner. 
 7.  Quinean Indeterminacy and the Natural/
Non-Natural Distinction 
 I began by noting that there seems to be a prima facie mismatch between 
the persistence conditions apparently exhibited by the referents of singular 
terms, as they are standardly used in ordinary discourse, and the persistence 
conditions we would expect these objects to have if our ordinary singu-
lar terms in fact referred to mereological sums. Lewis proposes to remedy 
this prima facie mismatch by means of his natural/non-natural distinction, 
which is formulated so as to apply directly to the extensions of predicates 
and only indirectly to the referents of singular terms. By appeal to the natu-
ral/non-natural distinction, Lewis hopes to be able to make out the diff er-
ence for example between a highly eligible referent for the name ‘Bruce’, 
when employed in its intended use as a name for a particular cat, and the 
many not-so-highly eligible chunks of miscellaneous and ever-changing 
matter in the vicinity of Bruce, the cat. Of course, given Lewis’s independent 
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commitment to standard mereology, Bruce, the cat, in Lewis’s view, is itself 
just a chunk of feline tissue. 18 Nevertheless, so the proposal goes, the bound-
ary between Bruce, the cat, and its surroundings is better demarcated by 
diff erences in the distribution of highly natural properties (such as density 
of matter, relative abundance of chemical elements, loci of causal chains, and 
so on) than the boundary between many of the other chunks of matter that 
are in the vicinity of Bruce, the cat, and their surroundings. 
 When I implied just now that there is just a single highly eligible referent 
for the name, ‘Bruce’, as it is employed on this particular occasion as a name 
for a specifi c cat, I was really oversimplifying. For, in addition to the com-
ponents of Lewis’s approach already mentioned, we must also add to the 
mix his ‘Many, But Almost One’ doctrine (Lewis 1993a). According to this 
doctrine, in any ordinary situation in which we may fi nd ourselves employ-
ing a name like ‘Bruce’, in its intended role as a name for a particular cat, we 
will really be faced with a plurality of ‘many-but-almost-one’ cat-candidates 
that are present in the vicinity of what we would normally think of as 
a single cat (e.g., aggregate C 
1
 of feline tissue minus one particular mol-
ecule; aggregate C 
2
 of feline tissue minus a diff erent molecule; and so on). 
Since these ‘many-but-almost-one’ cat-candidates, though strictly speaking 
numerically distinct, are mostly overlapping and overwhelmingly similar in 
all other respects relevant to our cat-related discourse, Lewis believes that 
our best strategy is simply to acknowledge a certain (moderate) degree 
of indeterminacy in our singular terms. Just as no semantic decision has 
been made or is called for concerning for example a term like ‘heap’, as to 
exactly how many grains constitute a heap, similarly no semantic decision 
has occurred, is likely to occur, or needs to occur, which would single out 
some particular one from among the many perfectly good cat-candidates 
in the vicinity of what we normally think of as a single cat. If we combine 
Lewis’s ‘Many, But Almost One’ doctrine with the other components of 
his approach already cited, we arrive at the conclusion that, according to 
Lewis’s view, while the natural/non-natural distinction may distinguish for 
us some of the roughly cat-shaped chunks of feline tissue in the vicinity of 
what we would normally consider to be a single cat, we will nevertheless 
 18  I am using the term ‘feline tissue’ in a way that presupposes that feline tissue is present only where 
(living) cats are present. Thus, given this use of the phrase, the presence of detached cat-parts, cat-corpses, 
and the like would not for present purposes be suffi  cient to ensure the presence of feline tissue. This 
assumption is of course benefi cial to the Lewisian. 
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be left with a plurality of equally eligible potential referents for the name, 
‘Bruce’, when employed on a particular occasion in its intended use as a 
name for a specifi c cat. 
 Earlier in this chapter, we discussed an argument mounted by Gareth 
Evans whose intended purpose was to show that in fact not all of the dif-
ferent interpretational hypotheses entertained by Quine do an equally good 
job in accounting for the assent- and dissent-behavior we would actually 
expect to observe on particular occasions in ordinary speakers of natural 
languages. In particular, Evans’s argument against Quine purports to show 
that we can in fact tell the diff erence between the following two com-
peting interpretational hypotheses:  the hypothesis according to which a 
term like ‘rabbit’ divides its reference over undetached rabbit-parts and the 
hypothesis according to which the term in question divides its reference 
over enduring rabbits. For, among other things, if Evans is right, then the 
former hypothesis cannot, while the latter hypothesis can, account for the 
fact that speakers would not assent to a compound expression of the form, 
‘White rabbit?’, when faced with several brown rabbits whose white tails 
are arranged contiguously. 
 Notice that Lewis’s metaphysical and semantic commitments precisely 
put him into the camp of those who are subject to Evans’s argument against 
Quine, since in Lewis’s view cats just are (certain) mereological sums of 
undetached cat-parts. These mereological sums therefore provide the availa-
ble choices of objects over which the general term, ‘cat’, can divide its refer-
ence and to which the singular term, ‘Bruce’, can refer, when it is employed 
in its intended use as a name for a particular cat. The main relevant diff er-
ence between the interpretational hypothesis considered by Quine and that 
endorsed by Lewis is that Lewis invokes one additional piece of apparatus not 
present in Quine’s account, viz., the natural/non-natural distinction. Our last 
remaining task at this point in the dialectic, then, is to see whether Lewis’s 
appeal to the natural/non-natural distinction can help him overcome Evans’s 
objection against Quine. Not surprisingly, my project in the remainder of this 
chapter will be to argue that Lewis’s invocation of the natural/non-natural 
distinction by itself is not suffi  cient to ward him off  against Evans’s objection 
to Quine. 
 For the purposes of establishing this conclusion, I will make several simpli-
fying assumptions, which I hope will not detract from the substantive issues 
at hand. Let’s suppose, fi rst, for the sake of simplicity, that our world is much 
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less complicated at the level of the perfectly natural properties than it in fact is. 
For example, we might imagine that the world at the most fundamental level 
is how the Presocratic philosopher, Empedocles, pictured it, with just four 
perfectly natural properties, viz., those corresponding to the general terms, 
‘earth’, ‘air’, ‘fi re’, and ‘water’. And let’s assume furthermore that all the other 
predicates in our language can be defi ned somehow (in more or less lengthy 
ways) in terms of these four predicates which denote the perfectly natural 
properties, together with numerical ratios which express the proportion of 
earth, air, fi re, and water that is present in a given object at its most fundamental 
level of composition. Given this picture, it might turn out to be the case for 
example that the extension of the predicate, ‘cat’, consists of mereological sums 
which exhibit the following ratio of elements: two-eighths earth, two-eighths 
fi re, three-eighths air, and one-eighth water. (We might think of this numerical 
ratio of elements as analogous for example to the chemical formula for water, 
viz., H 
2
 O, which tells us not only what sorts of elements constitute water but 
also in what proportion these elements are present in this substance.) Finally, 
let’s make a further simplifying assumption, which Empedocles did not make, 
namely that we can think of the four elements as occurring in the form of 
small indivisible particles or atoms, so that the world according to this fi ctional 
account consists at the most fundamental level of four diff erent kinds of atoms, 
viz., earth-, air-, fi re-, and water-atoms. 19 
 According to this fi ctional account, then, we have an item in the exten-
sion of the general term, ‘cat’, whenever we have earth-, air-, fi re-, and 
water-atoms present in the proportion of two parts earth, two parts air, 
three parts fi re, and one part water. 20 , 21 Suppose now that a given speaker 
is employing the name, ‘Bruce’, on a particular occasion as a name for a 
 19  Even according to this highly simplifi ed picture, there are many more possible dimensions along 
which entities at the most fundamental level could vary. For example, atoms could diff er from one 
another not only with respect to the kind to which they belong (earth, air, fi re, or water), but also along 
such dimensions as size, shape, weight, and so on. I will abstract away from these possible additional 
parameters of variation and assume, for the purposes of this argument, that all atoms belonging to a 
given kind are uniform with respect to these further parameters. 
 20  Perhaps, our atomistic Empedoclean version of Lewis would want to add to this formula determining 
the extension of the predicate, ‘cat’, that the atoms in question must also be in close spatial proximity to 
one another. Without explicitly mentioning this additional condition, I will assume that it is met by the 
mereological sums in question which qualify as possible cat-candidates. 
 21  Since our real-world knowledge tells us that cats can in practice diff er from one another, among other 
things, in terms of their size, it would not be plausible to assume (even within the confi nes of this highly 
simplifi ed fi ctional story) that we could give a defi nition of what belongs into the extension of the 
predicate, ‘cat’, not just in terms of numerical ratios of elements, but rather in terms of precise numbers 
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specifi c cat. Assuming that the speaker manages to carry out his referential 
intentions successfully on this particular occasion, then (given our current 
assumptions) we know that at least one mereological sum must be present 
in the vicinity of the speaker which consists of two parts earth, two parts air, 
three parts fi re, and one part water. In fact, in practice, whenever one such 
mereological sum is present in the vicinity of the speaker, there are many 
more such mereological sums which are present alongside the fi rst one and 
which also exhibit the right ratio of elements to qualify as cat-candidates. 22 
For example, suppose C 
1
 is the aggregate of feline tissue which is composed 
of the following earth-, air-, fi re-, and water-atoms: [(E 
1
 + E 
2
 ) + (A 
1
 + A 
2
 ) + 
(F 
1
 + F 
2
 + F 
3
 ) + W 
1
 ]. A diff erent aggregate of feline tissue, C 
2
 , also currently 





 ) + (A 
1
 + A 
2
 ) + (F 
1
 + F 
2
 + F 
3
 ) + W 
1
 ]. C 
1
 and C 
2
 , though strictly speaking 
numerically distinct, diff er from one another only with respect to the pres-
ence or absence of a single atomic part: C 
1
 has E 
1
 among its proper atomic 
parts and lacks E 
3
 , while C 
2
 has E 
3
 among its proper atomic parts but lacks 
E 
1
 . Otherwise, they overlap with respect to all of their other proper atomic 
parts. It is therefore consistent with Lewis’s philosophical commitments to 
assume that, due to their largely overlapping nature, C 
1
 and C 
2
 would be 
equally highly eligible referents for the use of the name, ‘Bruce’, in its use 
on that particular occasion. Moreover, if this scenario is anything like how 
matters would stand in a comparable situation in the actual world, then, in 
addition to C 
1
 and C 
2
 , the speaker would fi nd himself on this particular 
occasion in the vicinity of many more such largely overlapping mereo-
logical sums, C 
3
 , C 
4
 , . . . , C 
n
 , many of which would qualify as equally highly 
eligible referents for the name, ‘Bruce’, in its use on that particular occasion. 
of atoms (e.g., along the lines of: a mereological sum, x, belongs into the extension of the predicate, 
‘cat’, just in case x has among its atomic proper parts k 
1
 earth-atoms, k 
2





 ’, . . . , denote natural numbers). 
 22  What if the scenario we are imagining is diff erent from the actual world not only in that it is 
Empedoclean and atomistic at the most fundamental level, but also in the following respect: on most 
normal occasions, when speakers take themselves to be referring to a single cat, there is in fact only a 
single mereological sum present in their vicinity which exhibits the appropriate ratio of elements to 
be placed in the extension of the general term, ‘cat’? Given my assumptions, such a world would have 
to be one in which cats for example can never sit on mats; for if they did, then additional mereological 
sums composed of the four kinds of elements would be in the vicinity of what ordinary speakers in that 
world think of as a single cat. What matters for our present purposes, however, is that it is in no way part 
of Lewis’s account that the world in fact must be so highly austere as we just imagined it to be, in order 
for ordinary speakers to be frequently successful in their referential intentions. 
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 , . . . , C 
n
 has its proper parts essentially. It is essential to the aggregate of 
feline tissue, C 
1
 , for example that its proper atomic parts are E 
1
 , E 
2
 , A 
1





 , F 
2
 , F 
3
 , W 
1
 . In the same way, the other mereological sums exhibiting the 
cat-ratio that are in the vicinity of the speaker on this particular occasion are 
also related essentially to their respective proper atomic parts. At the same 
time, given Lewis’s commitments, it cannot be essential to Bruce, the cat, 
that it have any of these atoms among its proper atomic parts. For any of 
C 
1
 , C 
2
 , . . . , C 
n
 , so we have assumed, are equally highly eligible referents for 
the name, ‘Bruce’, in its intended use on this particular occasion as a name 
for the specifi c cat in question; and C 
1
 , C 
2
 , . . . , C 
n
 , while largely overlapping, 
each diff er from one another at least with respect to the presence or absence 
of a single atomic proper part. Hence, it cannot be a requirement, in order 
for a given mereological sum to qualify as a potential referent for the name, 
‘Bruce’, in its intended use on this particular occasion, that any specifi c 
earth-, air-, fi re-, or water-atom present in the vicinity of the speaker, E 
1
 , . . . , 
E 
n
 , A 
1
 , . . . , A 
n
 , F 
1
 , . . . , F 
n
 , W 
1
 , . . . , W 
n
 , number among its proper atomic parts. 
All that is required of such sums is that they exhibit the ratio of elements 
characteristic of items in the extension of the general term, ‘cat’, viz., two 
parts earth, two parts air, three parts fi re, and one part water; but, for any 
specifi c atom present in the vicinity of the speaker on this occasion, there 
is no requirement that  it number among the proper atomic parts of the cat 
in question. 23, 24 
 23  Perhaps there are further requirements which a given mereological sum must satisfy in order for it 
to be selected as a potential highly eligible referent for the name, ‘Bruce’, in its intended use as a name 
for a particular cat. For example, such a candidate might have to bear certain cross-temporal relations 
to other cat-candidates which existed at earlier times and are connected to the speaker in specifi c 
ways. For example, events might have occurred prior to the present occasion which the speaker would 
describe in the following way, “A year ago, I adopted Bruce from the local animal shelter.” In that case, 
in order for a mereological sum which currently exhibits the cat-ratio and is present in the vicinity of 
the speaker to qualify as a highly eligible referent for the name, ‘Bruce’, this sum would have to bear 
certain cross-temporal relations to earlier mereological sums exhibiting the cat-ratio which were present 
in the vicinity of the speaker when the events he now describes as “A year ago, I adopted Bruce from 
the local animal shelter” occurred. But we can ignore these possible additional constraints on potential 
candidates for the reference of the name, ‘Bruce’, for the time being. For the purposes of my current 
argument, we can assume for example that the speaker has laid eyes on Bruce, the cat, for the very fi rst 
time just moments ago. 
 24  One might think that the situation in which the Lewisian currently fi nds himself can be improved if 
we permit him to require of the mereological sums in question that they satisfy additional  structural (i.e., 
 confi gurational ) constraints in order for them to qualify as proper cat-candidates. For example, we might 
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 At this point, we are in a position to see why Lewis’s account, despite its 
appeal to the natural/non-natural distinction, is still susceptible to Evans’s 
argument against Quine. Given the semantic and metaphysical machinery 
at Lewis’s disposal, nothing prevents us from interpreting both an apparent 
singular term like ‘Bruce’, in its intended role as a name for a particular 
cat, and a general term like ‘cat’ as merely a marker indicating the presence 
of cathood in the environment of the speaker. Our discussion above has 
brought out that a speaker’s assent to an utterance of ‘Cat?’ or ‘Bruce?’, on 
the Lewisian picture, is not only compatible with, but also in practice a reli-
able indicator of, cathood being instantiated many times over, by the many 
numerically distinct but largely overlapping mereological sums exhibiting 
the cat-ratio that are present in the vicinity of the speaker on a particular 
occasion. What the Lewisian account has  not told us (and, as far as I can see, 
lacks the resources to tell us) is how a term like ‘cat’ or ‘Bruce’ would man-
age to mark the boundary between a certain particular object satisfying the 
cat-ratio and some other such object or objects. 
 In this way, the Lewisian account wrongly assimilates the semantic behav-
ior of a general term such as ‘cat’ to that of a paradigmatic mass term like 
‘water’: for a mass term like ‘water’ precisely serves to indicate the presence 
of wateriness in the vicinity of the speaker, but without marking the bound-
ary between a single particular object that exhibits wateriness and another. 
Similarly, while an apparent singular term like ‘Bruce’, in its intended role 
as a name for a particular cat, on Lewis’s account, may serve to mark the 
presence of some specifi c mereological sums exhibiting the cat-ratio in the 
vicinity of the speaker, no one object in particular need be singled out by a 
felicitous use of the term in question. 25 
consider adding a condition of the following sort to the formula by means of which the extension of the 
predicate ‘cat’ is specifi ed: a mereological sum, x, belongs in the extension of the predicate, ‘cat’, iff  (i) the 
proper parts of x are atoms in the ratio two parts earth, two parts fi re, three parts air and one part water; 
and (ii) these atoms are arranged in  circular fashion. Still the situation will be unchanged: for whenever 
a speaker appears to be using a term like ‘Bruce’ successfully, as a name for (what the speaker thinks 
of as) a single cat, he will in fact be in the presence of a plurality of mereological sums whose proper 
parts satisfy the cat-ratio and exhibit a circular arrangement. (Or, at least, a successful use of a term like 
‘Bruce’, in its intended role, is compatible with the presence of a multiplicity of such circularly arranged 
cat-candidates in the vicinity of the speaker.) 
 25  What also comes to mind in this context is Strawson’s notion of a feature-placing expression, of which 
a paradigmatic example is ‘It is raining’ (see for example Strawson 1953). (Not surprisingly, the model of 
feature-placing expressions was used by Strawson and others as a potentially fruitful way of thinking of 
the semantic behavior of mass terms). While, as Strawson notes, a feature-placing construction, such as 
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 On this picture, then, we would wrongly expect a compound expres-
sion like ‘White cat?’ to behave semantically along the lines of Evans’s ‘Red 
water?’, i.e., as producing assent on the part of a speaker when whiteness 
is instantiated, cathood is instantiated, and their respective instantiations 
overlap spatially. But what is needed, so Evans’s argument against Quine 
indicated, in order to capture the assent- and dissent-behavior we would in 
fact expect to observe among speakers, is that we are given the resources to 
tell when whiteness is distributed in certain characteristic ways within the 
boundaries of one or more particular cats in the vicinity of a speaker on a 
particular occasion. 
 Lewis’s natural/non-natural distinction by itself, as I have tried to estab-
lish in this section, is not the right kind of tool to close the gap between 
the mere presence of mereological sums instantiating cathood and single 
enduring cats. After all, the discovery that the chemical formula correspond-
ing to water is ‘H 
2
 O’ did not suddenly transform the term, ‘water’, which 
up to that point had been used standardly as a mass term and continues to 
be used so today, into a singular count noun. In the same vein, the ability 
to state what the cat-ratio is in terms of the perfectly natural properties also 
would not by itself yield well-demarcated boundaries around individual 
cats. But such well-demarcated boundaries are precisely what is needed to 
account for the semantic behavior of singular count nouns like ‘cat’ and 
genuine singular terms, such as ‘Bruce’, which can be used to pick out such 
individual cats. 26 
‘It is raining’, marks the presence of a feature (viz., in this case, the occurrence of rain) in the environ-
ment of the speaker, its function is not to direct the discussion towards a particular object or objects 
in the vicinity of the speaker which are supposed to instantiate the feature in question. For example, it 
would sound rather strange to follow up someone else’s utterance of ‘It is raining’ with ‘What’s raining?’ 
or ‘Where is the thing that is raining?’ Rather, the use of ‘it’ in ‘It is raining’ is what is referred to by 
linguists as an “expletive ‘it’ ”: this kind of use of ‘it’ in a sentence does not play the role of a genuine 
subject term, indicating a particular object to which the predicate contained in the sentence ascribes a 
certain attribute. Rather, it is the whole sentence which marks the presence of a certain feature in the 
environment of the speaker, without containing a constituent whose purpose is to single out a particular 
object instantiating the feature in question. 
 26  It is also unlikely that an appeal to Ramsey sentences would be of any assistance to Lewis’s particular 
package of views, in helping him to overcome Evans’s objection against Quine (see for example Lewis 
1970, 1997). For Ramsey sentences take the form of existentially quantifi ed statements and hence would 
also not be suffi  cient to enforce singular reference in the face of multiple, equally eligible, candidates for 
the denotation of any particular expression. 
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 8.  Conclusion 
 In sum, while I am sympathetic to Lewis’s position that a credible account 
of reference and predication will need to appeal to the presence of 
well-demarcated boundaries among the objects referred to, I  have tried 
to bring out why I  am skeptical that his already heavily burdened natu-
ral/non-natural distinction among properties (i.e., predicate-meanings) can 
bear the additional weight of drawing boundaries in the right places around 
highly eligible candidates for the reference of our singular terms and the 
denotations of our general terms. If my arguments in this chapter are on the 
right track, then Lewis’s natural/non-natural distinction among properties 
does not do the work required to avoid Quinean indeterminacy. But Evans’s 
argument against Quine shows us why this result is undesirable: for, unless 
we manage to rule out some of the Quinean interpretational hypotheses, 
we in eff ect fail to predict correctly how actual speakers would behave on 
particular occasions of utterance. 
 Those who are in the business of giving an analysis of constructions 
involving full-fl edged reference and predication, as contrasting with con-
structions which require merely spatial overlap among the denotations of 
expressions or the presence of a certain feature in the environment of the 
speaker, should thus feel tempted to go in for an ontology that places more 
stringent structural constraints than those that are supplied by standard 
mereology on the objects that are available as candidates for the denotations 
of our singular and general terms. When evaluating competing approaches 
to the metaphysics of material objects, we should also keep in mind that the 
choices we make on the metaphysical side may have unwanted semantic 
consequences. 
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